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‘Relais actors’ and co-decision first 
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Parliament: the case of the advanced 
therapies regulation 
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ABSTRACT The processing of the advanced therapies regulation is of particular 
interest to scholars of the European Union’s (EU) legislative process and students 
of the European Parliament (EP) because it provides a case study which throws 
light upon assumptions commonly made about the role of the EP’s ‘relais actors’, 
the promotion of consensus-building within and between parliamentary committees, 
and the development of intraorganizational rules in response to early agreements in 
the co-decision procedure. An examination of the EP’s processing of the advanced 
therapies dossier provides an ‘unusual’ but vivid illustration of how the identification 
of committee rapporteurs as the most important parliamentary ‘relais actors’ fails to 
capture the increasingly important roles performed by shadow rapporteurs. Significantly, the 
‘unusual’ occurrences associated with the processing of the advanced therapies regulation 
came at a crucial juncture in the reconsideration of the EP’s intraorganizational rules in 
relation to early agreements and the subsequent adoption of new Rules of Procedure in 
2009. 
 
KEY WORDS European Parliament; co-decision, first reading agreements; relais 
actors; rapporteurs. 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On 30 December 2008 Regulation (EC) No 1394/2007 of the European 
Parliament (EP) and of the Council on advanced therapy medicinal products 
came into effect. This regulation had been signed by the Presidents of the European 
Parliament and the Council on 13 November 2007 and published as a lex 
specialis in the Official Journal on 10 December 2007. What started life as a 
Commission proposal, and finished life as the Regulation was a complex and 
technical measure designed to provide precise legal definitions of advanced 
therapy medicinal products, regulate industrially prepared or manufactured 
advanced therapy products and harmonize rules to ensure the free movement 
of such products within the European Union (EU). Certainly the Commission 
conceived of the measure as a matter of science, technology, regulation and the 
operation of the internal market. As such, the proposal appeared to be an ideal 
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candidate for an ‘early agreement’ in the co-decision procedure between the EP 
and Council – particularly as the Commission had identified early agreements 
as ‘desirable for the more technical and non-conflictual’ dossiers (Rasmussen 
2007: 5). The expectation of an early agreement was enhanced further by the 
fact that in the 2004–9 Parliament first reading agreements had become ‘in 
effect the norm in lawmaking within the European Union’ (HL 125 2009: 
37) with 72 per cent of co-decision procedures concluded at this stage (PE 
427.162 2009: 8). That the advanced therapies dossier was concluded at first 
reading was, in this sense at least, of little surprise. 
 
What was more of a surprise, however, was that the dossier was still concluded 
at first reading despite generating significant political conflict and, especially, 
intense controversy over ethics (interlinked with issues of national sovereignty) 
during its passage through the European Parliament. While the advanced therapies 
case raises important questions about the dimensionality of policy conflict 
within the EP – and particularly on occasion the importance of a ‘libertarian– 
traditional’ dimension involving ethical and moral conflicts alongside left–right 
and pro–anti integration axes – the specific focus of this article is upon what the 
processing of the dossier reveals about the role of the European Parliament’s 
‘relais actors’, the procedures promoting consensus-building within and 
between committees, and the development of intraorganizational rules in 
response to early agreements in co-decision. 
 
INTERORGANIZATIONAL AND INTRAORGANIZATIONAL 
PROCESSES 
 
The European Parliament, even before the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty, had established itself indisputably as a co-legislature with the Council 
of Ministers. After the introduction of the co-decision procedure under the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and after its extension under the Amsterdam 
Treaty in 1997, co-decision became what the European Parliament itself 
described as the ‘normal legislative procedure’ or ‘the standard procedure’. In 
successive increments, co-decision came to cover 44 policy areas, encompassing 
over 50 per cent of Commission proposals tabled under the first pillar, and was 
simplified procedurally to expedite the processing of legislative dossiers (under 
the second version known as co-decision2). In this sense, the Lisbon Treaty 
simply marked the culmination of this trend, with 95 per cent of EU 
primary legislation covered by the procedure and with co-decision formally 
designated as the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ (for an overview of the development of the 
procedure see Judge and Earnshaw [2008: 188–93, 230–6]). 
 
While the legislative powers of the EP have thus been enhanced and refined 
procedurally through exogenous, formal treaty revisions, a parallel process of 
development and innovation has also been apparent in the adoption of 
endogenous, informal rules and modes of behaviour within the EP. Indeed, 
throughout its history the EP has demonstrated a capacity to maximize its 
legislative influence beyond formal treaty-prescribed powers through the 
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creative use of its own Rules of Procedure and Informal decision-making 
processes (Farrell and Héritier 2007; Héritier 2007; Hix 2002; Judge and 
Earnshaw 2008). More specifically Farrell and Héritier (2004) have examined 
the interconnection between interorganizational and intraorganizational 
arenas of decision-making, and have sought to theorize how changes to the 
macro-organizational relationship between collective actors affects internal 
processes of decision-making and the bargaining strength of individual actors 
within each collective actor. In examining the changes to the co-decision 
procedure, and especially the innovation of the ‘early agreement’ provision in 
the Amsterdam Treaty, they hypothesize that: 
 
an exogenous constitutional change (the early agreement provision) from 
formal and sequential to informal and simultaneous interaction will first 
affect intraorganizational politics by changing the balance of power within 
each organization. Depending on the specifics of the constitutional change 
the influence of some individual actors (specifically, relais actors who 
engage with other organizational actors in the legislative process) over legislative 
outcomes will increase, whereas the influence of others will decrease. 
This will give rise to a subsequent effort by the organization (or, more precisely, 
the individual actors within the organization that have lost control 
over decision-making outcomes) to reestablish the status quo ante through 
the adoption of appropriate intraorganizational rules. (Farrell and Héritier2004: 1190–1, 
emphasis in original) 
 
The constituent elements of this proposition require some preliminary explanation: 
‘early agreements’, ‘relais actors’ and ‘appropriate intraorganizational rules’. 
 
Early agreements 
 
Initially co-decision was conceived as a procedure in which the Commission, 
Council and EP interacted with each other in sequential stages or ‘readings’ 
culminating, where necessary, in a formal conciliation process. However, when 
confronted by the practical difficulties of operationalizing the procedure, informal 
structures – most notably in the form of ‘trialogues’ – were introduced to 
facilitate and expedite negotiations between the three institutions. In turn, these 
informal structures and modes of behaviour became institutionalized in the 
Amsterdam Treaty in a provision which allowed for the adoption of legislation 
at the first reading stage. This provision enabled legislation to be adopted at 
first reading if agreement was reached between Council and EP upon amendments 
to the Commission proposal; whereupon the Council indicated its willingness to 
accept this outcome should the amendments be confirmed in plenary. In effect 
representatives from the three institutions enter into informal trialogue negotiations 
in anticipation of reaching an informal compromise.On the basis of compromises 
agreed with Council in these negotiations, the EP incorporates the 
Council’s position in its own amendments to be voted on at first reading (requiring 
a simple majority vote in plenary – and hence a lower threshold than the 
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absolute majority required for parliamentary amendments to be adopted at second 
reading). This then enables the Council, acting by qualified majority voting 
(QMV), to conclude the procedure by accepting the Commission proposal as 
amended by the EP, and voted upon in plenary, to be transposed into a legal act. 
 
In effect, therefore, first reading agreement constitutes a ‘fast track’ legislative 
procedure. Clearly such a ‘fast track’ procedure holds considerable attractions for 
the main legislative institutions and serves to institutionalize informal interorganizational 
negotiations. Clearly, also, given the decisive shift towards conclusion 
of co-decision dossiers at first reading stage, the lack of transparency and potential 
threats to democratic legitimacy have been identified as unattractive aspects of 
first reading agreements (e.g., Héritier 2007: 99–100; PE 406.309/CPG/GT 
2008: 25–6). While the attention of the EP, and of academics, has largely 
been preoccupied with these wider interorganizational and ‘macro’ political 
concerns, the importance of understanding the ‘micro’ intraorganizational 
issues associated with this shift has also intensified. In particular, a fundamental 
question remains for investigation: ‘How will an organization respond when 
an exogenous change increases the power of some relais actors over legislation 
vis-a-vis the organization as a whole?’ (Farrell and Héritier 2004: 1190). 
 
Relais actors 
 
Farrell and Héritier (2004: 1187), drawing upon Crozier and Friedberg’s 
(1977) earlier work, identify relais actors as those ‘who represent their own 
organization in discussions, [and who] form the link or “relais” to the other 
organization and owing to this link function are particularly powerful. They 
control the flow of information from their own organization to the other and 
vice versa’. In so far as they act as ‘gatekeepers’ or ‘information brokers’ relais 
actors are endowed with ‘power in the intraorganizational bargaining of outcomes’ 
(Farrell and Héritier 2004: 1188). Committee rapporteurs are identified 
by Farrell and Héritier (2004: 1200–1) ‘as the most important relais actors’ 
within the EP. They have ‘quite extraordinary latitude to set the agenda of negotiations’ 
and ‘are particularly powerful when they are closely linked to large political 
groups and power brokers within the larger political groups in Parliament’; 
and their influence is seen to have increased in early agreement negotiations as 
the ‘real discussion surrounding amendments have shifted from the committees 
into informal trialogues’. However, the obverse side of increased power for rapporteurs, 
according to Farrell and Héritier (2004: 1202), has been a diminution 
in the power of ordinary committee members generally, and of committee 
chairmen specifically, to the extent that ‘[o]ften they are effectively presented 
with a fait accompli by the rapporteurs and coordinators for the larger groups’. 
 
Appropriate intraorganizational rules 
 
Before examining Farrell and He´ritier’s specific contention – that the development 
of intraorganizational rules pertaining to first reading agreements have 
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reflected a desire to curb the scope for independent action by relais actors (or to 
use principal–agent terminology to reduce ‘agency loss’) – it is worth noting 
that such intraorganizational rule changes have also been prompted by other 
factors. The first is, as Farrell and Héritier themselves acknowledge, that rapporteurs 
do not act in isolation – that shadow rapporteurs and group co-ordinators 
also make a contribution in co-decision negotiations. Shadow rapporteurs are 
appointed, certainly by the major political groups, for most major reports. 
They act as a powerful focal point of group activity on dossiers, leading discussions 
on the group’s behalf and mobilizing and co-ordinating group activity in 
the tabling of amendments in committee. Increasingly shadow rapporteurs have 
also become involved in informal negotiations with the other institutions at first 
reading (see HL 125 2009: Q28, Q81); and in many cases in their interactions 
with the rapporteur ‘practically constitute informal subcommittees’ (Corbett 
et al. 2007: 141). Yet, although the respective position of shadow rapporteur 
and group co-ordinator ‘has become more and more significant in recent 
years’ (Corbett et al. 2007: 141; see European Parliament 2009: Rule 
192(3)), their contributions have ‘often and regrettably’ been overlooked by 
academics (Settembri and Neuhold 2009: 141). 
 
The second factor prompting intraorganizational rule changes, as Farrell and 
Héritier predicted, is that the very recognition of the enhanced role of rapporteurs 
at first reading precipitates an organizational response. But, unlike Farrell 
and He´ritier, the response may be conceived not simply as a zero sum attempt to 
recoup the ‘losses’ of individual actors (most notably committee chairs) but as 
an effort to generate collective mechanisms to regulate the independent 
action of rapporteurs. ‘Regulation’ has two dimensions: one positive in the 
sense of consensus-building, of securing wider support for deals reached in 
informal negotiations; and the second negative in the sense of monitoring, 
and where necessary constraining, the activities of relais actors during the 
course of these informal negotiations. 
 
One form of consensus-building entails the activities of rapporteurs and the 
expectation that they will ‘shepherd’ amendments through the legislative process 
while ‘seeking to reach consensus within the committees’ (Farrell and He´ritier 
2004: 1196). In this respect their relationship with shadow rapporteurs and 
group co-ordinators is of some significance in building and sustaining the 
necessary consensus to secure a successful legislative outcome. Another positive 
dimension of consensus building in the EP has been the gradual development of 
a procedure – initially framed beyond the formal Rules of Procedure and 
known as the Hughes procedure (Corbett et al. 2007: 136) but with elements 
subsequently incorporated formally into the procedure known as ‘enhanced 
co-operation’ (European Parliament 2004a: Rule 47) and since 2007 designated 
as ‘procedure with associated committees’ (OJC 102E 24 April 2008: 89) – 
whereby a legislative dossier that falls roughly equally within the competence 
of more than one committee requires those committees to co-operate. The 
form of co-operation varies (European Parliament 2009: Rule 50), but one significant 
aspect of the procedure specifies that the committee responsible accepts, 
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without a vote, amendments where agreement has been reached among 
committee chairs that they ‘concern matters which fall within the exclusive 
competence of the associated committee’ (Rule 50). Whereas this procedure 
was little used in the 1999–2004 Parliament, with only 27 reports adopted 
in this manner, in the 2004–9 Parliament some 56 reports based on the 
enhanced co-operation procedure were adopted in the first three years up to 
September 2007. This led Settembri and Neuhold (2009: 144) to identify 
this procedure as ‘one key factor on the path to reaching consensus’ among 
committees on important proposals of ‘high complexity’. 
 
EARLY AGREEMENTS: PROPOSITIONS 
 
The purpose of this article is to respond to Farrell and He´ritier’s (2004: 1208) 
call that ‘closer attention’ should be paid to intraorganizational responses to 
interorganizational changes. Attention will be focused, therefore, upon two 
basic propositions: first, the definition of relais actors and the assumptions 
that rapporteurs are the pivotal relais actors in negotiations at first reading 
Farrell and Héritier (2004: 1200); and second, that proposals for significant 
revision of intraorganizational institutional rules will emerge but that their 
adoption is problematic given ‘the internal strife among “winners’ and 
“losers”’ (Farrell and Héritier 2004: 1208). 
 
Proposition 1: Rapporteurs are the pivotal relais actors in early agreements. 
 
Given the rapid rise in the number of early agreements, it would be expected 
that the position of the rapporteur as ‘the most important figure within the 
EP’ in the co-decision process (Rasmussen 2007: 3) would have been strengthened 
further since Farrell and He´ritier’s article was published in 2004. 
 
Proposition 2: Appropriate intraorganizational rules: the regulation of the 
strategic modes of behaviour of the EP’s relais actors in their interorganizational 
transactions has assumed increased importance as early agreements 
become the norm in co-decision procedure. 
 
Farrell and He´ritier’s basic contention is that: ‘In general it is fair to say that early 
agreements have resulted in substantial tensions between individual actors within 
Parliament who have lost influence over law making and relais actors who have 
gained influence’ (2004: 1206). Following this logic, they note that ‘losers’ – 
most particularly committee chairmen and the EP’s vice-presidents – have 
sought to limit the discretion of rapporteurs, while rapporteurs in turn have 
resisted changes which they believe would make it more difficult to reach consensus 
in trialogues. Hence, the move to early agreements ‘triggered a lot of conflict 
within Parliament’. The simple proposition to be examined here is that as ‘early 
agreements’ in the co-decision procedure have become routine so the stakes in the 
intraorganizational conflicts become higher and, consequently, the regulation of 
the strategic modes of behaviour of relais actors in their interorganizational transactions 
attains a high priority in the EP. 
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CHOICE OF CASE STUDY 
 
The case of the advanced therapies legislative dossier provides an opportunity to 
examine the intrainstitutional interactions of key relais actors and committees at 
the first reading stage of co-decision. In this sense it sheds light on the often neglected 
but increasingly important, and ‘normal’, interactions among strategic 
parliamentary actors at first reading (for the value of descriptive case studies 
see Johnson et al. [2008: 150]). In another sense, however, the advanced therapies 
case provides an example of how the operation of ‘normal’ processes of 
consensus-building – through the enhanced co-operation procedure and the 
interactions of rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs – may culminate in a 
unique event (so far, at least) where the preferences of the rapporteur and an 
agreed report are overridden by other parliamentary relais actors – shadow 
rapporteurs – and the development of a ‘counter report’. In this sense the 
case falls into the ‘unusual’ (Gerring 2007: 101) or ‘extreme’ category of case 
studies (Flyvbjerg 2006: 229–30; Yin 2003: 40–3) of case studies. The case 
study is of value, therefore, in revealing how processes, which are designed to 
facilitate consensus-building, may result, in exceptional circumstances, in 
intrainstitutional conflict and contested legislative outcomes. 
 
The advanced therapies case is also of importance, moreover, in its elliptical 
connection with broader processes of procedural reform in the EP. Significantly, 
the ‘unusual’ occurrences associated with the processing of the advanced therapies 
regulation came at a crucial juncture in the reconsideration of the EP’s intraorganizational 
rules in relation to early agreements. The direct involvement of 
the Chair of the EP’s Working Group on Reform, Dagmar Roth-Behrendt, as 
PSE (Party of European Socialists) shadow rapporteur in the advanced therapies 
case provided critical insights into how intraorganizational interactions impact 
upon policy outcomes. 
 
CASE STUDY: NARRATIVE 
 
On 16 November 2005 the Commission presented its proposal for a Regulation 
of Parliament and Council on advanced therapy medical products (Commission 
of the European Communities 2005). The gestation period of the Commission’s 
proposal had been protracted and involved extensive public consultation. The 
proposal addressed some of the issues attendant upon the rapid development of 
gene and cell therapy and tissue engineering in the interconnected scientific 
fields of biology, biotechnology and medicine. The Commission justified the 
proposal as an attempt to ‘improve patients’ safe access to advanced therapies’ 
(Commission of the European Communities 2005: 3). Clearly the Commission 
conceived of the proposed regulation primarily as a measure that was: regulatory 
(by introducing a single, integrated framework of regulation); classificatory (in the 
sense of defining advanced therapy medicinal products); technical (in establishing 
detailed technical market authorization requirements and guidelines necessary to 
demonstrate ‘quality, safety and efficacy’ of the products); advisory (through the 
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creation of a Committee for Advanced Therapies); and harmonizing (by ensuring 
direct and harmonized access to the EU market). 
 
The EP’s processing of the proposal 
 
In December 2005 the Commission’s proposal was forwarded to Parliament’s 
Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (hereafter Environment 
Committee). The Industry (ITRE), Internal Market (IMCO) (which 
declined to produce an opinion), and, subsequently, the Legal Affairs Committees 
were also deemed responsible for producing opinions. In May 2006 the Legal 
Affairs Committee won the right to enhanced co-operation with the Environment 
Committee (under the then Rule 47 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure). Miroslav 
Mikolášik (European People’s Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED), 
Slovakia) was appointed as the Environment Committee’s rapporteur, and 
Dagmar Roth-Berendt (PSE, Germany), Fre´de´rique Ries (Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), Belgium) and Adamos Adamou (European 
United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL), Cyprus) were appointed as 
shadow rapporteurs for the major political groups. In turn, Pia Locatelli (PSE, 
Italy) was appointed as draftsperson for ITRE, and Hiltrud Breyer (Greens, 
Germany) as draftsperson for the Legal Affairs Committee. 
 
Before deliberation in the EP’s committees much of the lobbying associated 
with the proposal had focused on the relatively technical concerns of industry 
about the Commission’s proposed wording of the legislation. Yet, in March 
2006, David Earnshaw, in advising the Environment Committee, forewarned 
that: ‘A major concern that Parliament will need to address is the approach 
taken by the Commission in responding to the lack of consensus in Europe 
about research involving embryonic stem cells and xenogeneic products’ (PE 
373.573 2006: 1). This ‘lack of consensus’ was highlighted further at a public 
hearing on advanced therapies organized by the EP’s EPP-ED group on 11 
May 2006 (EPP-ED 2006). The hearing was co-chaired by Miroslav Mikolášik, 
as rapporteur, and Peter Liese (EPP-ED, Germany), who was the chair of the 
EPP-ED’s bioethics working group. 
 
What the EPP-ED hearing signalled was the existence of two separate arguments 
in relation to the Commission’s proposal, and that the proponents of 
each side were largely talking past each other. On the one side was a discussion 
about the detail of the proposal as a way of enabling and supporting industry in 
the development of new advanced therapies and establishing a licensing system 
for such products; and on the other was an argument about the ethics of 
embryonic stem cell research and the application of this and similar technologies 
in medicine (see respectively Niese [2006] and Klepaka [2006]). 
 
Committee discussions had started by the time of the EPP-ED hearing, with 
the ITRE and the Legal Affairs Committees adopting their respective opinions 
in June and July 2006. The opinion of the Legal Affairs Committee was of 
particular significance as the Committee had, under the EP’s Rule 47, 
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secured ‘enhanced co-operation’ with the Environment Committee. This rule 
was to prove to be of vital importance in the processing of the proposal. 
 
The opinion of the Legal Affairs Committee resonated with one side of the 
argument noted above. The draftsperson Hiltrud Breyer, a long-standing 
critic of biotechnology, in the justification of the opinion, made clear that: 
 
The principle of the non-commercialization of the human body has to be 
respected. . . . The production of human-animal hybrids or chimeras constitutes 
a breach of the principle of the integrity of the person and of the 
principle of inviolability of human dignity. (PE 374.450 2006: 3–4). 
 
In the event, all but 4 of the 60 proposed amendments submitted to the Committee 
were tabled by either Hiltrud Breyer or Peter Liese. Of the four amendments not 
tabled by Breyer and Liese, only two were adopted by the Committee and submitted 
subsequently to the Environment Committee; and, in total, some 49 
amendments were adopted and forwarded to the Environment Committee. 
Most of these reflected the views, therefore, of critics – or at least sceptics – of 
biotechnology. A strong Green/EPP-ED alliance focused on bioethics had thus 
emerged on the processing of this proposal. Significantly, in the final vote on the 
opinion all EPP-ED members (or substitutes) turned out to vote in the Legal 
Affairs Committee, but only half of the Socialists and Liberals voted. 
 
Not surprisingly, given Breyer’s statement noted above, a number of ‘ethical’ 
provisions were included in the amendments adopted by the Legal Affairs 
Committee (PE 374.450 2006: Amendments 5, 20, 12, 39). However, on 
the other side of the argument, and as a result of Liese’s amendments, industry 
concerns were met on a number of (arguably) minor issues (PE 374.450 2006: 
Amendments 27, 29, 30, 33–36, 47–49). 
 
Most amendments tabled in the ITRE, the other opinion-giving committee, 
were identical to those tabled in the Legal Affairs Committee (PE 371.930 
2006). Indeed, Slovak and Czech EPP-ED members Ja´n Hudacky´ and Jan 
Brˇezina respectively tabled exactly the same amendments that had been tabled in 
the Legal Affairs Committee by draftsperson Breyer. It was no coincidence, 
therefore, that the outcome of the vote in ITRE was broadly similar to that in 
the Legal Affairs Committee. Equally, not surprisingly in the circumstances, the 
draftsperson, Italian Socialist Pia Locatelli, (who was opposed to the ‘ethical 
amendments’) asked for her name not to be associated with the opinion forwarded 
by ITRE to the Environment Committee. As a result, the chair of ITRE, Giles 
Chichester (EPP-ED, UK), took over the opinion in his name. 
In September 2006, the Environment Committee scheduled consideration of 
tabled amendments for the day before the Committee was due to vote. Fortyeight 
amendments were tabled by the rapporteur in his draft report and a 
further 72 amendments were tabled by other members. Again, there were 
clear signs of collusion by the opponents of biomedicine across the committees. 
The amendments tabled by the rapporteur, Mikolášik, included those tabled 
already in the opinion giving committees by his EPP-ED colleague, Liese, 
and by the Green MEP, Breyer. 
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Most of the amendments tabled, including the ‘ethical amendments’, were 
adopted in the Environment Committee’s vote on 14 September primarily 
through the support of a majority of members of the EPP-ED, Greens and a 
few ALDE committee members (for details see PE 378.649 [2006: 8–9]). In 
particular, members of these groups who shared the position of Mikolášik, 
Liese and Breyer on ethical issues turned out to vote in committee. Other 
members, even up to the vote in committee, still tended to regard this proposal 
as largely technical and focused on the rather intricate details of pharmaceutical 
licensing. The success of the ‘ethical amendments’ during the vote, however, 
galvanized opposition to the position of Mikolášik, Liese and Breyer. 
 
The position of the PSE members of the Committee was clearly to reject the 
‘ethical amendments’. The PSE’s shadow rapporteur, Dagmar Roth-Behrendt, 
also sought to clarify the basis on which member states could continue to 
apply national legislation which restricted the use of certain human or animal 
cells, or the sale, supply or use of medicines based on embryonic stem cells. 
Roth-Behrendt’s amendment had been developed following advice from Parliament’s 
Legal Service; and sought to reconcile the conundrum of how national 
ethical rules regarding embryonic stem cells could continue to apply alongside 
harmonizing legislation, based on Article 95 EC, which envisaged their use as 
the basis for medicinal products licensed by the European Commission. Ultimately, 
however, this amendment was rejected ‘amid a moment of pronounced 
confusion’ (Agence Europe 27 September 2006). By the time the vote was taken 
on the Commission’s proposal as amended, it had become clear that many individual 
amendments, which were unacceptable to a majority of the Environment 
Committee’s members, had in fact been adopted. Moreover, further confusion 
was to reign when, after the vote on the amendments in the Environment 
Committee, the Committee decided to reject in its entirety (by a vote of 33 to 
24 with one abstention) the Commission’s proposal as amended. 
 
Such confusion reflected the fact that supporters of Mikolášik’s stance, primarily 
Greens and EPP-ED, had organized in advance of the Committee’s 
meeting and so managed to mobilize majorities on votes on amendments 
tabled in the early rounds of voting. Once these initial successes began to be 
registered, however, other members of the Committee came to recognize, belatedly, 
the threat posed by the early amendments. Indeed, there was a dawning 
recognition throughout the voting session of 14 September 2006 that, what 
had been perceived initially by many MEPs to be a technical and esoteric 
regulation, in fact cloaked highly contentious and highly divisive ethical 
issues. For notable numbers of PSE and ALDE members the technical 
complexity of the regulation obscured the significance of its ethical dimensions 
until these dimensions were highlighted by the success of Mikolášik in securing 
the early amendments. At that late stage a majority was constructed, effectively 
by corralling opponents to the ‘ethical amendments’ – many of whom had 
been absent at the start of the voting session – to overturn the amendments 
by voting against the report as amended. The PSE and ALDE Members on 
the Committee voted to reject, while the EPP-ED and Greens voted in 
 63 
 
favour of the amended proposal. This was a remarkable and almost unprecedented 
event in any committee of the European Parliament. 
 
The decision to reject reflected the fundamental fissures within the Environment 
Committee over this issue and provides an exception to the general proposition 
advanced by Settembri and Neuhold that ‘committees are real 
consensus-builders’ (2009: 131), and that they ‘generally work very consensually, 
regardless of the issues at stake and procedure applied’ (2009: 147). 
Clearly, in the case of advanced therapies, this general proposition did not hold. 
 
A revised version of the Mikolášik draft report returned to the Environment 
Committee in January 2007. This time the rapporteur sought to ‘find the 
broadest possible consensus’ (PE 380.740 2007: 41) through formally dropping 
(while informally continuing to advocate) the controversial ‘ethical amendments’ 
that had led to the rejection of his earlier draft report. He remained 
convinced that the approach chosen by the Legal Affairs Committee was the 
correct one. Thus, while proffering compromise and consensus to placate 
those committee colleagues who had so dramatically rejected his first efforts 
as rapporteur, he continued stubbornly to pursue the position effectively 
rejected some months earlier in September 2006. 
 
The revised draft report was adopted at the end of January 2007, by 55 votes 
to 6 with 3 abstentions. Significantly, two amendments submitted by the Legal 
Affairs Committee were incorporated into the report on the basis of the then 
Rule 47 (see above) without a vote. The purpose of the amendments was to 
exclude from the Regulation ‘products using materials which are controversial 
and for which differing Member States legislative provisions are intended to 
remain’; in other words, those which ‘contain or are derived from human 
embryonic and foetal cells, primordial germ cells and cells derived from those 
cells’ (PE 374.450 2006: 10). The outgoing Chair of the Environment 
Committee, Karl-Heinz Florenz (EPP-ED, Germany), judged these two 
amendments to fall within the competences of the Legal Affairs Committee 
rather than the Environment Committee. They were subsequently incorporated 
into the Environment Committee’s report for direct submission to plenary. Predictably, 
given their genesis and content, these amendments became the focus of 
heated disagreement thereafter. Indeed, the temperature could immediately be 
gauged from the Commission’s initial reported response that these amendments 
were ‘unacceptable’, ‘radical’, and ‘dangerous for public health’ (Agence Europe 
22 February 2007). 
 
Beyond committee: informal trialogues 
 
The German Presidency, anxious to broker an agreement at first reading, convened 
an initial trialogue on 28 February 2007, which included the rapporteur, 
shadow rapporteurs, Commission officials and the Council. It was clear from 
the outset that the Council and Commission would not accept the two 
‘ethical amendments’. Nonetheless, by early March, Walter Schwerdtfeger of 
the German Ministry of Health believed that ‘agreement is not far off’ (European 
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Voice 8 March 2007). This belief was founded upon the apparent willingness of 
Mikolášik to focus upon the technical aspects of the dossier and to compromise 
on the assessment of advanced therapies at EU level but with decisions as to their 
use in national territories left to member states. Yet this belief also proved to be 
unfounded as, by the end of March, negotiations had all but collapsed. Indeed, 
the prospects of agreement looked remote when rapporteur Mikolášik decided 
to abandon negotiations, during the final stage of a trialogue held on 30 
March, because Council negotiators refused to discuss the two ‘ethical amendments’ 
which had been voted by the Legal Affairs Committee and then included 
in the Environment Committee’s report without a vote. Mikolášik was reported 
to have brought negotiations to an end ‘with the official support of German 
Green, Hiltrud Breyer, and that of German Christian Democrat, Peter Liese 
(who was not directly taking part in the negotiations)’ (Agence Europe 3 April 
2007). In an EPP-ED press release of 30 March, Mikolášik noted that a first 
reading agreement was unattainable and, therefore, there would have to be 
second reading. He proceeded to note that: 
 
I’m very much disappointed and regret the delay we have to face now. But I 
can’t accept the non-respect of the competence of one of the major parliamentary 
committees. And I can’t accept the criticisms about the delay from those 
who rejected my draft report in September of last year. (EPP-ED 2007) 
 
These criticisms had come from both inside and outside of the EP. Inside, 
Dagmar Roth-Behrendt (PSE 2007) berated the rapporteur’s ‘irresponsible behaviour’ 
which had ‘given preference to his personal position’ and had ‘delayed 
the adoption of this important piece of legislation for at least another 12 
months’. Outside, Eurordis, an umbrella organization representing patients 
with rare diseases, amplified the criticism of Mikolášik for ‘eliminat[ing] the 
possibility of a first reading adoption of the long awaited regulation’ and for 
having done so on the basis of his ‘personal religious beliefs’ (Agence Europe 6 
April 2007). 
 
Counter report 
 
Despite Mikolášik’s termination of negotiations, the shadow rapporteurs – primarily 
those of the PSE (Dagmar Roth-Berendt), ALDE (Frédérique Ries) and 
GUE-NGL (Adamos Adamou) – worked around this impasse by continuing to 
negotiate with Council without Parliament’s rapporteur. In doing so, it was 
clear at this stage that the EP could not be conceived as a ‘unitary’ or ‘consensual’ 
actor. Indeed, by the time of Parliament’s April 2007 plenary session, a 
package of 75 amendments to the Commission’s proposal had been agreed 
with Council. These were tabled as a ‘counter report’ to plenary in the names 
of the PSE, ALDE and GUE-NGL groups. Support for this new package was 
sought by the shadow rapporteurs in a letter to MEPs which called on them 
to approve the agreed package with Council and proposed the rejection of 
the Legal Affairs Committee’s ‘ethical amendments’. Importantly, the signature 
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of Françoise Grossetête (EPP-ED, France), who was one of Mikolášik’s party 
colleagues and a Vice-Chair of the EPP-ED, was also appended to this letter. 
Numerous patients associations – including Eurordis and other groups 
representing patients with cancer, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS), diabetes and genetic diseases – also campaigned, with the encouragement 
of the Commission, for adoption of the ‘counter report’. 
 
The ‘counter report’ was discussed in plenary on 23 April 2007. In a frequently 
acrimonious debate the two sides took the opportunity to clarify 
their positions. Mikolášik dismissed the compromise reached by the shadow 
rapporteurs as ‘individual action . . . undertaken without the knowledge of the 
rapporteur’ (EP Debates 23 April 2007). He called upon plenary to support 
the report of the responsible committee – the Environment Committee – 
and pointed out that many of the amendments incorporated in the ‘counter 
report’ ‘do not have the support of the committee responsible, the other two 
committees nor of the rapporteur’. He also drew attention to the ‘clear 
provisions in the Rules of Procedure on enhanced cooperation between parliamentary 
committees’ which had resulted in the inclusion of the ‘ethical amendments’ 
in the first place, and pointedly recorded his belief that ‘apparently, 
enhanced cooperation is respected only when it suits certain colleagues’ (EP 
Debates 23 April 2007). 
 
Roth-Behrendt responded by recording the nature of the deal she and her 
fellow shadow rapporteurs had struck with Council. She noted that of the 75 
amendments contained in the ‘counter report’, 32 were identical to those 
adopted by the Environment Committee, 18 were linguistic changes, 10 were 
compromises agreed with Council (which she pointed out that Mikolášik had 
supported in trialogue before breaking off negotiations), and 15 covered 
other linguistic or legal concerns. Moreover, she observed that the Commission 
and Council ‘really supported us in reaching a result’ and added that in her view 
‘they have come as close to Parliament’s positions as they could – going further 
than I have seen before and further than I expected them to go’ (EP Debates 23 
April 2007). ALDE shadow rapporteur Fréderique Ries was equally clear, pointing 
in particular to the support that the ‘counter report’ had from some EPP-ED 
members: ‘Something that has not yet been said is that this package also has the 
support of a number of MEPs from the Group of the European People’s Party 
(Christian Democrats) and European Democrats and, contrary to what was 
explained by the rapporteur, it is accepted by the Commission and by the 
Council’. Such explicit support was evident in plenary debate with 5 of the 
10 EPP-ED speakers recording their concern about the ethical amendments 
(though Peter Liese did note in his contribution that, in an internal EPP-ED 
vote the ‘overwhelming majority’ supported the ‘ethical amendments’). 
 
Confirmation of Council’s support came in plenary from Klaus Theo 
Schröder who, on behalf of the German Council Presidency, noted that the 
‘ethically motivated amendments’ could not be agreed by Council and that ‘it 
is the package produced by the shadow rapporteurs of the named groups on 
which agreement is possible at Council level’ (EP Debates 23 April 2007). In 
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the subsequent plenary vote MEPs voted by 403 to 246 with 11 abstentions in 
favour of the PES–ALDE–GUE-NGL compromise. 
 
The first reading agreement with Parliament was confirmed in May 2007 at 
the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council. On 
30 October 2007 Council formally adopted the Regulation, after lawyer– 
linguist finalization. It was signed by Parliament and Council Presidents on 
13 November 2007 and published in the Official Journal on 10 December 
2007 (OJ L 324, 10 December 2007: 121). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Proposition 1: Rapporteurs are the pivotal actors in first reading 
negotiations 
 
The starting proposition of Farrell and Héritier (2004: 1200) was that rapporteurs, 
in their strategic position as relais actors in informal negotiations at first 
reading, are endowed with ‘quite extraordinary latitude’ in negotiations with the 
Council. However, the processing of the advanced therapies dossier reveals the 
perimeter boundaries of such latitude. In this case, the rapporteur proved not to 
be the only, or the most decisive, parliamentary relais actor. Effectively the rapporteur’s 
preferences were circumvented by a group of shadow rapporteurs. In 
Mikolášik’s own words this case: 
 
marked a decisive separation from Parliamentary practice, whereby the shadow 
rapporteurs . . . bypassed the rapporteur and proposed new text to the vote, 
thus undermining the role of the European Parliament in the co-decision 
process. . . . This circumvention of customary practice [is] contrary to the 
sprit of democratic debate and the rule of law. (Mikolášik 2007: 324) 
 
There was perhaps a certain irony that a rapporteur – who was believed by his 
shadow rapporteurs to have given ‘preference to his own personal position 
against a European Parliament unanimous decision’ and in so doing had 
damaged ‘the image of the European Parliament and the effective functioning 
of European institutions’ (PSE 2007) – should invoke the persistent normative 
concerns about transparency and the undermining of the EP’s collective contribution 
to the processing of co-decision dossiers. 
 
Proposition 2: The development of appropriate intraorganizational 
rules 
 
In 2001 the EP’s Vice-Presidents proposed that early reading negotiations should 
be based on an appropriate mandate and that ‘the starting point’ for negotiations 
should be ‘active Council participation in Committee meeting’ (European Parliament 
2001: 5). This was seen by Farrell and Héritier as an attempt by ‘losers’ in 
the EP to introduce intraorganizational rules to regulate the latitude of rapporteurs, 
as ‘winners’, in their informal negotiations with other institutional 
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actors. A more forceful attempt to regulate relais activity came inNovember 2004 
when the EP’s Conference of Presidents approved Guidelines For First and 
Second Reading Agreements (European Parliament 2004b). 
 
Although non-binding, the 2004 guidelines sought to limit the scope for 
independent action on the part of rapporteurs and to establish ‘a yardstick 
against which the behaviour of negotiators, above all, their ability to keep the 
confidence of their colleagues, both inside and outside the committee, can be 
judged’ (Rasmussen and Shackleton 2005: 20). When the EP’s Working 
Party on Parliamentary Reform, established in February 2007 with Dagmar 
Roth-Behrendt as its chair, attempted to use this yardstick it encountered difficulty 
in determining ‘to what extent these guidelines have been applied since 
their adoption’ (PE 406.309/CPG/GT 2008: 26). Moreover, Roth-Behrendt’s 
direct experience of the intrainstitutional tensions encountered during the EP’s 
processing of the advanced therapies dossier would have done little to dissuade 
her from the view that the guidelines needed to be revised ‘with a view to 
strengthening their content’ and to ‘enhancing their status and improving 
their visibility’ (PE 406.309/CPG/GT 2008: 27–8). 
 
Of particular significance for present purposes was the recommendation of 
the Working Party to move the emphasis of the 2004 guidelines away from 
rapporteurs simply informing other parliamentary actors (shadow rapporteurs, 
group co-ordinators and committee chairs) of their activities, to a position 
where these other actors would be involved directly and formally in first 
reading negotiations. In this respect the Working Party made specific reference 
to a ‘negotiating team’ and that a decision to enter into first reading negotiations 
should also include specification of ‘the composition of the negotiating team 
(rapporteur, committee chair, shadow rapporteurs)’ (PE 406.309/CPG/GT 
2008: 27). The importance of shadow rapporteurs and group co-ordinators 
in the negotiating process was underlined in the recommendation that ‘the 
role, rights and duties of shadow rapporteurs and co-ordinators [should be 
clarified] in the Rules of Procedure’ (PE 406.309/CPG/GT 2008: 28). This 
recommendation found reflection in Rule 192 in the EP’s new Rules of 
Procedure, adopted in May 2009 and which entered force at the beginning of 
the EP’s seventh mandate in July 2009. 
 
In addition, a new Code of Conduct for Negotiating in the Context of 
Co-Decision Procedures was also included in the new Rules of Procedure (European 
Parliament 2009: Annex XX). While the term ‘negotiating team’ was retained in 
the Code of Conduct, it was notable that specific reference to shadow rapporteurs 
and committee chairs as part of the team was dropped in favour of a ‘general 
principle’ that ‘political balance shall be respected and all political groups shall 
be represented at least at staff level in these negotiations’. Nonetheless, at a 
minimum, shadow rapporteurs (and committee chairs and co-ordinators) were 
expected, if time prevented full committee involvement, to receive reports from 
the negotiating team and to take decisions on agreements reached in trialogues. 
 
Indeed, new Rule 70 required EP negotiators, in seeking agreements with the 
other institutions under the co-decision procedure, ‘to have regard to the Code 
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of Conduct’. The new rule sought further to regulate the activities of the EP’s 
relais actors by ensuring that before they entered into negotiations ‘the committee 
responsible should, in principle, take a decision by a majority of its members 
and adopt a mandate, orientations or priorities’. Moreover, ‘if the negotiations 
lead to a compromise with Council following the adoption of the report by the 
committee, the committee shall in any case be reconsulted before the vote in 
plenary’ (European Parliament 2009: Rule 70). 
 
In this way Rules 70 and 192, and the Code of Conduct, served to delineate 
the EP’s most important relais actors in early agreement negotiations (and to do 
so more broadly than Farrell and He´ritier’s [2004: 1200] initial definition), as 
well as seeking ‘to minimize the risk that specific actors within the organization 
will take opportunistic advantage’ of informal first reading negotiations (as 
predicted by Farrell and Héritier [2004: 1190]). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In heeding Farrell and Héritier’s call – that greater attention should be paid to 
the intraorganizational consequences of the move to early agreements in the 
co-decision procedure – this article has identified, through examination of the 
case of the advanced therapies dossier, how the definition of ‘relais actors’ in 
the EP needs to be extended beyond committee rapporteurs themselves. The 
importance of shadow rapporteurs in the negotiating process, and in the final legislative 
outcome, was starkly revealed in the processing of the advanced therapies 
dossier. Indeed, more generally in the EP itself, it has become increasingly 
common for the contribution of shadow rapporteurs to be acknowledged in 
early agreement negotiations (see, for example Toine Manders, EP Debates 10 
March 2009; Salvatore Tatarella, EP Debates 2 April 2009; Neena Gill, EP 
Debates 22 April 2009). Indeed, the rule changes enacted in July 2009 
formally recognized the position of ‘negotiating teams’, rather than simply the 
rapporteur, in seeking agreements under the co-decision procedure (European 
Parliament 2009: Rule 70 and the Code of Conduct). More explicitly, Rule 
192(3) states that committees ‘may in particular decide to involve the shadow 
rapporteurs in seeking agreement with the Council in co-decision procedures’. 
 
The advanced therapies case study also exposed the limits of consensus in 
committees. Rule 47 (European Parliament 2009: Rule 50) was clearly designed 
to enhance consensus-building among EP committees. In the case of the 
advanced therapies dossier, however, this rule led to the inclusion of two amendments 
in the Environment Committee’s report which, far from securing consensus, 
exposed deep fissures within and between the EP’s negotiators. Not only did 
these amendments limit the possibility of intraorganizational agreement, they 
also limited the possibility of interinstitutional agreement; as both Commission 
and Council respectively deemed them to be ‘unacceptable’ and ‘a definite 
obstacle to agreement’. 
 
The manifest divisions and disjunctions within the EP in its processing of the 
advanced therapies dossier occurred at the very time, February 2007, that a 
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Working Party on Parliamentary Reform had been established by the EP’s 
Conference of Presidents. Undoubtedly the experience of the Working 
Party’s chair, Dagmar Roth-Behrendt, as PSE shadow rapporteur for the 
advanced therapies dossier, at the very least, provided her with some critical 
insights when examining the ‘work in committees and negotiations on codecision 
files’. The outcomes of this examination, found in the Working 
Party’s recommendations for Rule changes and in the EP’s adoption of new 
Rules and a Code of Conduct in 2009, provides support, therefore, for 
Farrell and Héritier’s contention that ‘losers’ within the EP have sought to 
control the discretion exercised by rapporteurs (as initial organizational 
‘winners’) in early agreement negotiations. 
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